tv Cabinet Secretaries Testimony on the Iran Nuclear Agreement CSPAN September 1, 2015 9:00pm-10:16pm EDT
but we are one nation among many. and what separates us from the empires of old, what has made us exceptional, is not the mere fact of our military might. since world war ii, the deadliest war in human history, we have used our power to try to bind nations together in a system of international law. we have led an evolution of those human institutions, president kennedy spoke about it. to prevent the spread of deadly weapons. to uphold peace and security. and promote human progress. we now have the opportunity to build on that progress.
we build a coalition and have it together, through sanctions and negotiations, and now we have before us, a solution that prevents iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon without resorting to war. as americans, we should be proud of this achievement. congress,bers of reflect on their pending decisions, i urge them to set aside political concerns. shut out the noise. consider the stakes involved with the vote that you will cast. congress kills this deal, we will lose more than just constraints on iran's nuclear program. by the sanctions we have painstakingly built. we will have lost something more precious. america's credibility. as a leader of diplomacy.
credibility as the anchor of the international system. cautioned here, more than 50 years ago, at this university, that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war. but it is so very important. it is surely the pursuit of peace that is most needed in this world so full of strength. s my fellow americans, contact your representatives in congress. remind them of who we are. remind them of what is best in us, and what we stand for, so we can leave behind a world that is more secure and more peaceful for our children. thank you very much. [applause] ♪
>> representative adam smith, the ranking members of the house armed services committee, has come out in support of the run nuclear deal. he released a statement today saying in part, -- congress returns on september 8 and they will debate the iran nuclear deal. that is at the top of their list. the verge of on of thesuccess, the story democratic senator who holds the seat long occupied by both -- put president joe biden has the obama administration on the verge of victory.
senator cowan's announced on the campus of the university of delaware today that he would provide the reader vote against the resolution of disapproval for the nuclear agreement with iran. that puts the agreement one vote short of the number needed to sustain a presidential veto. that is the story from roll call. we will have live coverage of the nuclear agreement debate in the house and senate, when members return. up here, our special programming on the iran nuclear deal continuing with a look at two hearings on the negotiators -- or with the negotiators, first portions of the senate foreign relations committee with a precarious state john kerry, energy secretary moneys -- mo niz, and the treasury secretary. the following day, before the house foreign affairs committee. >> on the next "washington ", the chief legal officer of the financial industry regulatory authority
talking about his organization's role as a nongovernmental regulator of the securities industry. you at the so-called cadillac expensive -- expensive health insurance plans. it goes into effect in 2018. we will talk about it with julie appleby of kaiser health care in our spotlight on magazine series, peter grier of the christian science monitor joins us to talk about his recent article on how americans decide who to vote for in presidential elections. washington journal his life with phone calls -- is live with phone calls and tweets every morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern on seas -- c-span. >> secretary of state john kerry speaks about the iran nuclear agreement wednesday at the philadelphia constitution center. you can see it live at 11:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span. now a portion of a july senate foreign relations committee
i want to thank the witnesses for being here today, and we look forward to a hearing. i want to thank all of those in attendance. i know there was a little bit of an outbreak prior to us convening. we thank you for being here. we do hope you will respect that now the meeting is in order. outbursts of any kind are unwarranted and we respect the democratic process that is taking place. we thank you for being here. we also thank you for your courtesy as we move ahead. agreedthe witnesses have
to be here as long as we wish. so we will start with seven minute questions. i do know based on last night's presentation, there is sometimes a tendency for witnesses to want to interject. what i would say is obviously we conduct our meetings with a lot of respect and courtesy, and i told ask the witnesses respond directly to the question with senators on both sides of the aisle. when you ask it directly to a witness, get them to respond. someone else wants to interject, they can indicate they want to do so. free totors should feel say i just wanted that witness and move onto the next to make sure we don't end up in a filibuster situation and we can get questions answered. i want to start today by .hanking our committee
we would not be here today, we would not have the information that we have today if we had not passed the iran nuclear agreement review act. this would not be taking place. i think the american people now understand what this debate is all about. when congress put in place sanctions to bring iran's -- iran successfully to the table as we did, we granted the executive branch something called a national security waiver. and what that meant was, the executive branch had the ability to lay our congressionally mandated sanctions to suspend them until such a time as we permanently waive them down the road. as you know, unfortunately, over the objections of senator cardin and myself, unfortunately the executive ranch went directly to the united nations this monday
morning. something that certainly was not in the spirit of this. but this was what was always intended. i do want to say that while secretary kerry has often said, congress will have the ability to weigh in at some point in time buyer to the law being being -- prior to the law passed, we now read the agreement and realize what he meant was a years from now. we would have the opportunity. stated in thes agreement. i want to thank everybody. all 19 members for coming together unanimously, making that happen. and giving us a role. but a role that did not exist prior to that passing. i hate to say, we had a briefing last night and i left and spoke to members on both sides of the aisle. i was fairly depressed after last night's presentation. deal,very detail of the witnessesaid out, our
successfully batted them away with the hyperbole that it is either this deal or war. and therefore we were never able to appropriately get into the questions. as pulled secretary out a letter that was written in 2008 by the prior administration. i don't know if he will refer to that today. but as i thought about it, i realized that what he was we give out was unless enron what they want, -- iran what they want, x. that's what it was about. let me walk through that. we have been through an incredible journey. we began 20 months or so ago with a country that was a rogue
nation. that had a boot on its neck. and our goal was to dismantle their program. have ended up in a situation where the deal that is on the table basically codifies the industrialization of their nuclear program. amazing transition that has occurred. and yet everyone here, not a person in this room including everyone here knows there is not one practical need for the program. not one. we have not had a single scientist, not a single witness can lay out any reasoning, not a run -- single reason for a to be developing this program from the standpoint of what it means to them from a similar endpoint. not one. nine months after this agreement goes into effect, we realized u.n.after monday's
adoption, unless congress intervenes, and 90 days this will be implemented. -- sixnths after that months after that, all of the that exist will be lifted. incredible. a few remaining sanctions, but the big ones that matter will be lifted. they have access to billions of dollars. their economy will be growing, they will be shipping all around the world. it is an amazing thing. and so what happens, i think all this figure this out. right now, we have some leverage. but nine months from now, the link -- leverage shifted, because we have a sanctions snapback. if we ever try to apply that, is what is called a nuclear snapback. the way the deal is structured, they can immediately just say,
if you add sanctions, we are out of the deal. the leverage ships to them. the p ndp, i think most of us call it the previous military dimension, we know they were involved. bearingy, that has no per the agreement. the witnesses say, if we don't deal in this it won't implement. but according to the agreement, it has no bearing whatsoever on whether sanctions are removed or not. and yet that was such an important piece for everyone to know. anytime anywhere in sections. last night we had witnesses being, i never said that. that has been a part of the mantra from day one. a part of their mantra. anywhere, anytime. now we have a process that they are declaring is 24 days. we know that is not right. iaea hasns after the
found violations that they are concerned about, and then you give a wrong time to respond to that, and by the thymic cakes and there is a 24 day process. but it could be months. as we know, in laboratories when you are developing a nuclear easy to it is very cover things up like that. all the focus has been on finding uranium. there are aspects of this that are very difficult to find. this is thesaid most comprehensive inspection regime. that's not true. i have spoken to secretaries of state and others. more rapidr inspection process in iraq. that certainly did not serve us particularly well. then and i have written of letter asking for additional materials we do not have. havef the items we don't is regarding the agreement
between iran and the iaea. my sense is we are never going to get that letter. entity that we are relying upon to find out whether iran is cheating, we are not even going to have act is to that. but we do know one of the characteristics is very interesting. we have a professional athlete in chattanooga that spends about a month there. he is incredibly a role model. he has got incredible integrity. he's a role model for the world. i was talking to him a couple of weeks ago about the program that professional athletes go through for drug testing. there are qualities to this that unfortunately, i'm told i cannot get into.
but there are qualities to this program that would not be unlike send her owntes to urine samples in the mail, and -- asieving that believing that it came from them. i've got some questions. i want to talk about who we are dealing with here. have been to iraq many times. listening toforget the general in baghdad. , he would we visit have on his coffee table, the i fp's that were and kill americans. they were laying out. the ied's.
they were laying on the coffee table. every single one of them made by a ron. once we develop the technology to counter that, what they did next was develop something called eft. penetrator.formed if they have an explosion. it heats up copper to go through andece of machinery to maim dismember americans. this was all a ron -- iran, every bit of it. we have visited these incredible heroes that have lost in some cases, to arms and a leg. some cases, two legs into arms. two arms. we see them all over the country. they are living with this today. this is the country we are dealing with. a country that created some of
the most disturbing types and methods of meaning americans that have a been seen. ambassadorto kill an here in washington dc not long ago. we know that. then and i went over with others see somethingto the holocaust museum had put together. a young man named these are had taken a photograph -- caesar had taken a photograph of the syrian presence, which by the way, a iran a side would not even being in office if it were not for iran. the torture has been photographed and caught -- chronicled. it is an amazing thing. it is happening right now, i laid, as we sit here. some people might say, that was iraq, but this is happening this very second, with the support of
iran. do you understand that? people's genitals right now are being amputated. people are being electrocuted. this is happening this very second in a prison in syria that iran is supporting. someone say we have not done as much as much as we could to stop it because of these negotiations. college, i wasn't a particularly good student. the first part of college i was interested in sports. the latter part was interested in working. i learned one thing. learned about the credit -- critical path method. i ended up building all over the country. i learned that you start with something like this, and you layout out a vision and build it out. you begin with the end in mind and you put first things first. it is the critical path. what i have seen our secretary he developed a
tremendous warmth with iran's foreign minister. but when i think he has actually done in these negotiations is codified a perfectly aligned pathway for iran to get a nuclear weapon just by abiding this agreement. look at the things that they need to do, the way it is late out. i don't think you could more perfectly laid it out. -- laid out. from my perspective, mr. secretary, i'm sorry. thatnlike a hotel guest leaves only with a hotel , i believe you have been fleeced. in the process, of being fleeced, which you have done
here, you have turned iran from being a pariah to now congress being a pariah. ago, you were saying that no deal is better than a bad deal. is no way that there that you could have possibly been thinking about war a few weeks ago. no way. now,et what you say to us and said it over and over yesterday, that if somehow congress were to turn this down, if congress were to turn this down, the only option is war, whereas a few weeks ago for you, for you to turn it down, the only option is war. i don't think you can have it both ways. if congress were to say these sanctions cannot be lifted, it wouldn't be any different than the snapback that we now have where, in essence, the united
states on its own, the united states on its own can implement snapback, but my guess is the other countries, as you stated before, would not come along. we have got to decide which way that it is. i know you speak with a degree of disdain about our regional partners when you describe their reaction to this deal. the things we have to remember is if we had actually dealt with dismantling their nuclear program, they wouldn't even responding in the way that they have. notnot only is this occurred, in addition, we are lifting the ballistic missile embargo in eight years. i have no idea how that even entered into the equation, but it did at the end. we are lifting the embargo in five years.
unbelievably, we are immediately lifting the ballistic missile testing program. we are lifting that band. i have to say that based on my believe you have crossed a new threshold in u.s. foreign policy. we are now at the policy of the united states to enable a state sponsor of terror to obtain sophisticated, industrial nuclear development program that has only one real practical need. that is what you hear it today to ask support. i look forward to the testimony and the appropriate questions. senator cardin. senator cardin: first mr. chairman, thank you very much for convening this hearing. i want to thank secretary kerry and lew.tary moniz,
have beenssistance to negotiating. incredible service to our country, incredible sacrifice to families. very much for your dedicated service, your -- hard work, and your service to america. the iranian nuclear agreement review act that senator worker referred to passed earlier this year, was an effort by the members of congress to set up the appropriate review for a potential deal with karen. -- with iran. we are pleased that with difficult negotiations, we were able to get a unanimous vote of the committee to get the support of the white house, and we believed we accomplished two major objectives. in passing that statute.
first of course, we set up the appropriate review for congress. it allows us to take action, or we don't have to take action. it recognizes the fact that the sanction regime was passed by a role toand we had play in regards to implementing any agreement as we now see in oa that congress has a role to play. so it set up for an early process. this hearing is part of the process. it took you two years to negotiate this agreement. took two months at the energy that final details. we are on day four of our review of 60 days. i have not reached a conclusion. and i would hope that most members, i would hope members of the congress would want to get all the information, allow those who were directly involved to make their case.
we have hearing set up the following week. we will get outside experts. many of us have taken advantage of that opportunity in the past and i would hope we would all use that opportunity before drawing a conclusion. this is a very important agreement for the point of view of u.s. foreign policy. iran and the region is critically important to the united states security. but there is a second objective to the nuclear review act. that is to concentrate all of our efforts on iran. and speak with unity as much as we could in the united states. couldt our negotiations concentrate on vienna and not on washington. in dealing with getting the very best possible agreement. you, mr.t tell chairman, i have looked at the framework that was agreed to in april, and looking at the final agreement we have gotten today,
our negotiators got an awful lot. particularly on the nuclear front, which is beyond my expertise. we got things that there were many rumors during these last wasle of months of what going to be in this agreement. and how it was going to be the april frame -- framework, that in fact have been strengthened. i want to applaud our negotiators for taking the strength of our unity and turning it into results. we will be talking a little bit about that. the objective is clearly to prevent iran from ever becoming a nuclear weapon power. that is our simple objective. we know who we are dealing with. this is a state sponsor of terrorism. this is a country that abuses human rights, that violates the
ballistic missile area. we know all that. we singularly are trying to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power because we know that is a game changer in the region. that is the objective of this agreement. and the standard that we have to use, because there is no trust in iran for us, the supreme friday after the agreement said, we will trample upon america. we don't trust iran. but we have to leave emotion out of this. we have to look at the agreements. and we've got to determine whether the compliance with this agreement by the united states will put us on a path that makes it less likely are more likely that iran will be coming nuclear weapon power. that has got to be the test that we use. mr. chairman, i have many questions. that i hope we will get answers today.
i hope those answers will provoke a debate among us in congress on the american people, and help us make the right decisions. thee there is no trust, inspection enforcement regime is particularly important. we need to understand how it works. time tosubmission discover if karen is violating the terms of this agreement in order to take effective action to prevent iran from becoming a power. that is the question we need to understand. we need to know the breakout time. we need to know what happens after the time. sufficient opportunity to prevent iran from ever becoming a nuclear weapon state. are the instructions robust to deter iran from keating, and if they do, will rediscover and be able to take action. mr. chairman, you raise the 24 hour window. i think all of us recognize their is going to be a protocol
for inspection. that does not catch us by surprise. we need to know whether the 24-hour delay, knowing what iran is likely to do, does that compromise our ability to have inspections? i hope our witnesses will deal with that today because that is a matter of major concern. we need to know the answer to that. have we cut off all pathways for iran to obtain a nuclear weapon? particularly the covert military use operations. we know that is of major concern. that is why the pmd is particularly important. the chairman mentioned that. , i the work that the iaea were international extractors. they had great credibility in this area. we want to know whether they have the capacity to do what we are asking them to do. the axis that we need. we do need to know about prior military dimensions. in order to be able to go
forward and make sure we can contain any opportunity they may use for covert activities, will lead to discover it and be able to take actions? these are questions that we are going to ask. we have read the agreement. we still have questions and we will hope we get answers as to whether we have effectively prevented iran from using covert activities to develop a nuclear weapon. us, this agreement provide iaea, with position access to the people, places, and documents, so that we know their prior military dimensions? i does not back provisions for be imposing sanctions adequate if karen violates the agreement? -- if karen violates the agreement? that's an issue i hope we have time to talk about. at the end of the time limit, iran will have the capacity to expand -- mr. chairman, the group to pasadena making get
through there a nuclear enrichment that they can do. ,o we have sufficient capacity knowing their commitments for nonproliferation, knowing the requirements of the additional protocol, is that going to be adequate to prevent iran -- do we have a significant enough breakout time that if they tried to become a nuclear weapon state, there will be sufficient tools to prevent them from becoming a power? these are questions we need to have the answer to before we can make judgment. there are other areas. i want to be reassured the united states still has the possibility to impose nonnuclear sanctions on a rant for support of terrorism, human rights abuses and against the ballistic missile pressed -- program. no one expects their bad behavior to change. we know who we are dealing with. the we be able to use powers we have used in the past, and build upon them to take action against iran,
particularly in light that they will have additional resources. can we do that? and can congress work with the administration to strengthen those tools without violating the jc poa? i want to know how the administration is updating its regional deterrence strategy against the stabilizing iranian activities and how we can work with partners to build capacity to counter iran, especially israel. the chairman mentioned the lifting of the international arms embargo. that is a great concern, as to how low will have impact on our regional partners. how will it impact in arms race? these are questions we need to get the best information we can in making our decisions. lastly, let me mention this. i think it is critically important. what are our options if we walk away from this? how will be be received internationally?
will we be able to maintain sanctions with international partners? and will iran come back to the negotiating table with a country that has walked away from an agreement? these are questions we need to understand. we need to know that the options are right now, do we go forward and what are the options, what are the consequences if we don't? mr. chairman, we have a full plate, and i look forward to hearing from the witnesses. i hope the members of this committee will use the information we get today to debate the issue, take the time we have, and do what is right for the american people, and ultimately make the decision that we think is best to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power. senator corker: thank you senator cardin, i appreciate so much the way we have worked together in the entire committee. with that, i know that our witnesses here today need no introduction. they are well-known not only here but around the world in
spite of our policy differences, i think each of us deeply appreciate them that make this. we deeply appreciate the tremendous effort that you have put out on behalf of the country. we thank you for being here today. we thank you for being willing to be here today as long as it takes for everybody to get their answers. and with that, i would like to introduce electively, that's collectively, secretary john kerry. moniz, who hast been understanding the technical aspects of the deal. -- who has been affirmedle positionsl,ew the entire time, we thank you in spite of some of these concerns.
i think you all understand the drill. take five minutes or so to explain. as i looked at your testimony, i know it is brief. to warn people in advance, i'm going to defer my questions and move to you immediately thereafter and use my time to interject as things move on. with that, secretary kerry. secretary kerry: thank you, mr. chairman and ranking member cardin. we really do appreciate the chance to discuss with you the comprehensive plan that we and our partners have developed with therein regarding the future of this nuclear program. let me emphasize everybody, this is just the united states of america. these are other nuclear powers. friends -- france, britain, russia, china. they have a pretty good understanding of this field and
of the challenges. i have appreciated the way in which they and germany, which is the plus one, all came together, all contributed, all work part of this. thisre not just looking at table negotiating. you are looking at what the international community, the p5 was one, -- plus one, negotiated. they are experts. every one of them, and nuclear technology, and ratification, and verification. they are smart people who have spent a lifetime doing this. they have signed off on this agreement. i am joined by two cabinet secretaries, who's helped was absolutely invaluable. i think all of you for the role that congress plays. i was privileged to be the chairman of this committee when we passed the sanctions effort. debate.emember the we passed it unanimously. it played a very significant
the in bringing her into table and helping to make it clear that we needed to bring about a serious and productive negotiations with iran. from the day that those talks began, we were crystal clear that we would not accept anything less than a good deal. we defined it up front. as a deal that closed off for pathways to a bomb. uranium, plutonium, and the covert. and weour standard believed we have achieved that. after almost two years of intensive talks, the facts are crystal clear. the plan that was announced last week in vienna is in fact a deal that doesn't shut off those pathways. -- doesides us with shut off those pathways and provides us with guarantees with a lifetime and the participation of brand that we know what they
are doing. -- of a random we know what they are doing. they already have what they want. they got it 10 years ago or more. they already conquered the fuel cycle. when we began our negotiations, iran had enough fissile material for 10-12 arms. -- bombs. they had 19,000 centrifuges. up from the 163 they had back in 2003, when the prior administration was engaged with them on this very topic. this is not a question of giving them what they want. it's a question of how do you hold the program that? -- back? how do you dismantle the weapons program? let's understand what was really on the table. dismantle their
ability to be able to build a nuclear weapon, and we have achieved that. nobody has ever talked about actually dismantling their entire program, because when that was talked about, that is to they went from 163 19,000. everybody here knows what the options are for actually stopping that. it is called military action. they are not going to stop it otherwise. they have already proven that. they proved it all of those years. under the terms of this agreement, iran has agreed now to remove 98% of its stockpile. voluntarily. of their destroy 98% stockpile of enriched uranium. they will dismantle two thirds of their installed centrifuges, and take out the existing core of a heavy reactor and fill it with concrete. -- iran has agreed to
refrain from producing highly enriched uranium, and weapons grade plutonium for at least 15 years. and if they began to do that, moniz looked at you, we will know it immediately. agreed to accept additional protocol. that is outgrowth of the failure of the north korea experience, which put in additional access requirements, precisely so we do know what iran is doing. they have to ratify it before the un's sanctions are lifted at the end of this process. they have to have passed it. they have agreed to live by it from day one. they are going to live by the additional protocol. in addition, there are additional transparency measures. if iran fails to comply, we will
know it. and we will know it quickly and we will be able to respond accordingly. sanctions oning the way up to the most draconian options we have today. none of them are off the table in time.int many of the measures that are in this agreement are therefore not just 10 years, not just 15 years, not just 20 years. of which there are measures for each of those times. life, forever.r as long as iran was within the npt. north korea has pulled out, but iran has not. two years ago when negotiations began, we faced and around that was enriching uranium of the 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground. they were rapidly stockpiling hadched uranium and
installed nearly 20,000 centrifuges. they were building a heavywater reactor that could produce weapons grade for tony amador the rate to produce one or two bombs per year. experts assess the breakout time then as a result, the interval required to rush to be able to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon was about 23 -- two have been three months. if this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. except for the diplomatic support we have built with other countries, that we have accumulated, we pass that would disappear overnight. deal we haveve to reached is not what i have seen ads on tv suggesting disingenuously. it is a better deal. it is not some kind of unicorn arrangement involving iran's
complete situation. that is a fantasy, plain and simple. our own intelligence community will tell you. every single department of our intelligence community will reinforce that to you. the choice we face is between an agreement that will ensure the nuclear program is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and completely peaceful. or no deal at all. that is the choice. the fact is that there are 189 nations that live id npt -- by the npt. five of them are, as we know, the main nuclear powers of the u.n.. nonnuclear ine power. but they live by it. and we have lived by what the iaea does by assuring what all of those nations are doing, including 12 that enbridge --
enr ifi thec u.s. moves to unilaterallyh. be the the result will united states will walking away from all the restrictions we have received -- achieved. and a great big green light for a rented double enrichment, -- for a run to double enrichment, install more efficient center patients, and do it all -- centrifuges and do it all without transparency measures we have secured. prevented we have will then start taking place. all the voluntary rollbacks of their program will be undone. u.s., after the laboriously negotiating with five other partners were to walk away, we are on our own. our partners will not walk away with us. instead, they will walk away a sanctions regime they
helped to put in place. we will have squandered the best chance we have to solve this problem peacefully. make no mistake, president obama has made it crystal clear we will never accept a nuclear armed iran. he's only person who has developed a weapon capable of guaranteeing that. he has not only develop it, he has depleted. the fact -- deployed it. has,act is, iran now whether we like it or not, they have developed experience with a nuclear fuel cycle. developed the ability to produce fissile material for bombs. we cannot bomb that knowledge away. nor can we sanction the knowledge away. remember, sanctions did not stop the nuclear program from growing steadily to the point that it had accumulated enough this material to produce those 10 nuclear weapons.
by the way, they did not choose to produce them. unlike north korea, they created a nuclear weapon and exploded one, and pulled out of the npt. iran has done none of that. the truth is, the vienna plan will provide a stronger, more comprehensive, lasting means of limiting the nuclear program than any alternative that has been spoken of. and to those who are thinking about opposing the deal because of what might happen in the year 15 or 16 or 20. we walk away, year 15 or 16 or 20 starts tomorrow. any of the long-term verification or transparency safeguards we have but in place. havethe past week, i spoken at length about what this deal is. i want to make their what this deal was never intended to be. first of all, as the chief
negotiator, i can to you that i never uttered the words, anywhere, anytime, nor was it any part of the discussion we had with the radiance -- iranians. it was designed to discuss the nuclear issue and that alone. if we got caught up with all the other issues, we would never get where we needed to to stop the nuclear program. it would be staying there for account -- forever, negotiating one aspect after the other. the highest priority of president obama was to make sure they could not get a nuclear weapon. we were disciplined in that. we did not set out, even though we don't like it, and i have extensive plans i will layout to you if you want them, about how we are going to push back against their other activities. against terrorism, contributions to violence, all of those are unacceptable.
as much to us as they are to you. but i have news for you. can i runck against with a nuclear weapon is very different from pushing back without one. we are guaranteeing they won't have one. we are working very closely with the gulf states, today ashton carter was in saudi arabia. the foreign minister says that the nuclear deal appears to have all the provisions necessary to curtail the ability to obtain a nuclear weapon. the mris are supportive, the foreign minister of iran is going to be in the emirates this weekend. -- suggest wes are going to continue to press information about the missing american, the immediate release of americans who have been unjustly held, and there is not a challenge in the entire region that we want push back against -- one to push back
against if they are involved. but i would tell you, none of those challenges would be enhanced if iran gets a nuclear weapon. the outcome cannot be guaranteed by sanctions alone. i wish it could. but it cannot be. by the way, it also can't be guaranteed by military action alone. our own military tells us that. only viable option here is a comprehensive diplomatic resolution of the type that is reached in vienna. in that deal, we believe we will show it to you today, and in the days ahead, we will make our country and allies favor. it will ensure that the nuclear program remains under intense scrutiny forever, and we will know what they are doing. it will ensure that the world community is united in ensuring that iran's nuclear activities will remain peaceful, even as we also stay united in pushing back against its other activities in
the region which we object to. we believe this is a good deal for the world, a good deal for america, a good deal for our allies and friends in the region, and we think it does deserve your support. senator corker: thank you. secretary moniz. secretary: thank you. i appreciate the chance to discuss the jcp oa. iran froment events getting a nuclear weapon, provide strong verification measures that gets us time to respond if they choose to violate terms, and fundamentally takes none of our options off the table. i want to stress that america's leading nuclear experts in the department of energy were involved throughout negotiations.
they all played important roles. these nuclear experts work essential to evaluating and developing technical proposals and support of the u.s. delegation. as a result of their work, i'm confident technical underpinnings of this deal are solid, the department of energy stands ready to assist in the implementation. the deal meets the president's objectives of verification of any nuclear program, that it is exclusively peaceful and sufficiently time to respond if it is otherwise. the jcp oa will extend for at least 10 years, the time it would take for around run to aoduce fissile material for first explosive, to at least one year from the current rate at time of two or three months. the deal addresses the uranium industry -- enrichment, plutonium pathways. the luzon parameters, as the ranking member mentioned, are
maintained and strengthened, not weaker, but strengthened in the final agreement. this means restricting the number, type and location of centrifuges, dialing the r and, reducing enriched uranium stockpile of low enriched uranium, and prohibiting introduction of any fissile material. excess infrastructure is also removed from fordham. all these reasons taken together, the one-year break out timeline for accumulating highly enriched uranium. something we have not stressed, but i do want to add. at the end of these 10 years, iran will have far fewer than 19,000 centrifuges, because they ,cknowledge the breakage rate and they will not have a large replacement capacity because of the agreement. in addition, iran will have no source of weapons grade
plutonium. underactor is transformed international oversight and participation to produce far less plutonium than the current design. no weapons grade plutonium in normal operation. and essentially immediate recognition if they tried to deviate from that practice. furthermore, all of the irradiated fuel from that reactor goes out of the country for life. goes beyond the parameters in luzon, and a number of ways. one area is iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive. including multiple point explicit systems. and neutron sources. these commitments are indefinite . in addition to 15 years, iran will not pursue ternium or a ring him alley metal -- or
uranium alley metallurgy. material for an explosive device, so an additional -- additional time will be needed for the break out timeline. to be clear, the deal is not built on trust. it is a hard-nosed requirement that will limit iran's activities and ensure inspections. i can assure you this is not what iran wanted. it is a substantial dialing back of their program. to preclude eating, international inspectors will be given unprecedented access to all of their nuclear facilities. we could not make an exception if there were a military occupied operation, but that is not the case. as well as the entire nuclear supply chain from the uranium centrifuges patented manufacturing and operation. at this access, the supply chain comes with a 25 year commitment. beyond that, even after a
quarter-century of compliance with it peaceful program, we still have, as we have said many times, additional protocol in place to monitor the nuclear activities. another thing that we have also in perpetuity is there adherence to modified code 3.1, which modify the iaea before they start building any facility. -- notify the iaea. this eliminates a loophole where one can do something covertly and then say, we were planning to notify. they must do this in the planning stage. it is another thing we have the armed 25 years. -- beyond 25 years. the iaea will be prohibited from using advanced technologies. including real-time enrichment monitoring.
if the international community suspects iran is trying to cheat, they can request access to any suspicious location. much has been made about a 24 day process for ensuring iaea inspectors can get access. --ill say that i would like unlike secretary kerry, i did say the words anytime, anywhere and i am cleaved that yesterday and member of your caucus acknowledged that the full anytime, anywhere, in the sense of a well-designed process with a well-defined and time. -- end time. i'm pleased we establish that. to iaea can request access any suspicious location with 24 hours notice under the additional protocol, which iran will implement. the deal does not change that baseline. the deal is -- the issue is the agreement is not reached, then
when the iaea requests access, the 24 day clock will start. a finite new tool, time, a nude will for resolving disputes within what we think is a short period of time. short is defined because of our confidence in sampling, that we will then be able to implement and detect microscopic traces of nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the evidence of activities with nuclear material. in fact, the history provides a example. in february 2003, the iaea requested access to a suspicious facility in toronto -- tehran. it was the. negotiations dragged out for six months. even after samples revealed nuclear activity, even though they had made a substantial effort to remove and cover up
the evidence. we have in addition, conducted our own experiments to verify the ability to detect very very small traces of the agreement will be incremented increases, -- in phases, 20, 25 years. transparency measures that stay beyond 25 years. npt,ey are not in the every alarm bell would go off all of the place and appropriate actions would be taken. in closing, i want to acknowledge the tireless work of the negotiating team, led by my colleague, secretary kerry. the u.s. multi agency delegation worked together seamlessly. and the eu plus 3 displayed remarkable cohesion throughout this complex endeavor.
he continued collaboration and cooperation between believing nations, including the p5 is crucial to ensuring that iran complies with the jcpoa to avoid the reposition of international sanctions and other responses as well. i am confident this is a good deal for allies insecurity. iran will be farther from a nuclear capability all the time with, rather than without this agreement. thank you for the opportunity to be here. i look forward to the discussion. >> thank you. secretary lew. sec. lew: members of the
committee, thanks for the opportunity to speak today about the joint comprehensive plan of action. the foreign policy decision of this significance deserves your review. i'm confident a fair debate on the merits will strengthen our national security and that of our allies. the powerful array of u.s. international sanctions on iran constitutes the most effective sanctions regime in history. these measures have clearly demonstrated to iran's leaders the cost of flouting international law, cutting them off from international markets. today, the iranian economy is 20% smaller than what it would have been if it maintained pre-2020 growth. with the bipartisan support of congress in this committee. webther, we established a of the far-reaching international sanctions and ultimately persuaded iran's leadership after years of intransigence to come to the table to rollback its nuclear
program. international consensus and corporation to achieve this pressure is vital. the world's major powers have been, and remain united in preventing a nuclear armed iran. that unity of purpose produced four top un security council resolutions and national resolution sanctions and secured adherence to sanctions across the world. if the point of these sentient was to change iran's nuclear --havior without ea they revise that iran has taken keys cap's to rollback its -- key steps to back its nuclear program, sanctions really put come into effect. there is no signing bonus. to be clear, there will be no immediate changes to u.n., eu, or u.s. sanctions, only if i ran the bills the successful -- if iran fulfills the conditions
will sanctions be lifted on a phased-in basis. ones that target third-party bases doing part -- doing business with iran. if iran violates its commitments, once we have suspended the sanctions, we will be able to promptly snapped back at both u.s. and eu when sanctions. -- and un sanctions. since that requires an affirmative vote by the un security council, the u.s. has the ability to effectively force the reimposition of those sanctions. even as we face nuclear sanctions relief, we maintain sanctions that fall outside the scope of the nuclear deal, including our primary u.s. trade embargo. with some exceptions, iran will have sanctions targeting its support for terrorist groups such as has blocked -- as h
ezbollah, backing of the assad regime, and human rights abuses at home. just this week, several hezbh ollah leaders targeting the group's from leaders. some argue that sentence relief is premature until iran seizes these activities, and the funds iran recovers could be diverted for maligned purposes. i understand the concern. but iran's ties to terrorist groups is why we must prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. the combination of those threats raise a nightmare scenario. a nuclear armed iran would be far more menacing a threat. if we cannot solve both concerns at once, we need to address them in turn. jcpoa will address the nuclear danger, freeing us and our allies to check iran's nuclear
activities more aggressively. in contrast, walking away from the deal will leave the world's leading sponsor of terrorism with a short and increasing nuclear breakout time. we must also be measured and realistic in understanding what sanctions relief would really mean to iran. iran's $100 billion in restricted or reserves, which would be directed for nefarious purposes, constitute the long-term savings, not the annual allowance. after sanctions relief, iran would only be able to freely assess around half of these reserves for about $50 billion. that is because over to the billion dollars is committed to projects from china, where it cannot be spent, and tens of billions in additional funds in nonperforming loans in iran's energy and banking sector. iran can't simply spend the usable resources as they will likely be needed to be an international payment obligation such as financing imports or external debt.
moreover, president rouhani was elected on a platform of economic revitalization and faces an economic imperative to face the challenges. he faces over half $1 trillion in government obligations. iran is in a massive economic whole through which it will take years to climb out. ---economic hole. we will aggressively target any attempts to use funds gained from sex is really to support -- gained from sanctions support to support our partners in the gulf. trying to obtain a broader capitulation from iran be a mistake. even if one believes that extending sections pressure was a better course then resolving the threat of iran's nuclear program, that choice is not available. our partners agreed to pose costly sanctions for one reason, to put a stop to its illicit nuclear program. if we change our terms now and
assistance countries, -- and assist in these sanctions, we would be left with neither a nuclear deal nor effective sanctions. it's unrealistic to think that additional functions pressure would force iran to totally capitulate. and impractical to believe that we can march a global coalition of partners after turning down a deal that our partners believe is a good one. the joint comprehensive plan of action is a strong deal, with phased relief only after iran fulfills its commit to rollback nuclear program in a powerful snapback built in later, if they break the deal. its terms achieve the objective they were meant to achieve, blocking iran's path to a nuclear bomb. that is the overriding national security priority, and it should not be put at risk, not with the prospects of unconstrained iranian nuclear program presents such a threat to america and the world. thank you and we look forward to
answering your questions. >> thank you all very much. senator cardin. sen. cardin: it's been stated many times that the u.s. maintains its ability to oppose sanctions relative to support of terrorism, human rights violations, and ballistic missile issues. i have read the juicy po, -- the jcpoa, and there are many paragraphs in that give me concern. let me just read one, paragraph 29. parties will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly or adversely affect normalization of trade and economic relations with iran. secretary lew, i want to get your assurance that we have full ability to use the tools of sanctions against iran for its support of terrorism and human rights and nonnuclear type of
activities, which include congressional action that congress might want to take. it wasw: senator cardin, a matter of extensive discussion in the negotiations. we made clear in the negotiation that we retain the ability, and we will keep in place sanctions on terrorism, on regional destabilization, on human rights violations. in fact, we are not lifting sanctions that are based on those authorities. we are not designating entities that were designated for those reasons. we have also made clear we reserve the right to put additional sanctions in place to address concerns about terrorism, human rights. "we,"r cardin: you saw does that include congress of the u.s.? sec. lew: there is legislation thing regarding hezbollah. we will work with you on that legislation. the thing we can do is just put
them right back in place, everything that was of the nuclear sanctions, just a new label on it. we reserve our rights to put sanctions in place that address the continuing maligned activity. the iranardin: sections act expires at the end of 2016. we will still be in the jcpoa period, a time when snapback of sanctions is a viable hedge against iran cheating. is that permitted under the jcpoa? sec. lew: if it's on expiration, that's one thing, it's in advance, that is another. coming out of the box right now is very different from what you do when it expires. cardin: the question is, why would that be?
we would get to that. the 24 days that you referred to, and i appreciate her .xpiration they could be using nuclear material that is in violation. you have addressed that issue as far as the 24 days. it could involve weaponization or research not using nuclear material. with the 24 days delay, in those cases, they come for mice our ability to determine whether iran is in plants with the agreement. --c. lew: again, thereoniz: again, even there is a spectrum. for example, working with uranium metal is something that would still involve nuclear material. i think we would have very very strong tools there.
when we go to some other activities, not getting into too many specifics, there will be a variety of signatures. my second priority on the weaponization list would be explosively driven neutron sources. certainly telltale iaea inspectors would have access to that. when you get into areas like computer modeling, that is a different kind of detection. cases, we are going to rely upon intelligence abilities, those of our partners to be able to point the iaea to seditious activities. -- two suspicious activities. it gets more, located. -- it gets more comp catered.
complicated.e senator cardin: i understand they have obligations under the nonproliferation treaty. but could you tell us how much lead time we have after the 15 years and what assurances do we have that we will be able to detect that action before iran becomes nuclear weapons ready? sec. kerry: throughout the entire life of the agreement, the additional protocol provides the right of access, that is where the 44 hours notices for access comes from.
-- the t4 our notice -- 24 hour notice for access comes from. p5+1, israel, countries in the region, we have an incredible amount of sourcing. they have to respond to that. if they don't respond to that, convene,he ability to to vote, or to take other actions if we deem that appropriate. after 15 years. let me just fill out for you -- we also have a 20 year component that allows us to track centrifuge production of the rotors and bellows. sight, which year in is an